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In the Supreme Court
of the State of Utah
WELDON R. REEDER,

\

·

Plaintiff and Appellant,)
vs.
GENERAL MOTORS CORP.,
a Corporation,

I

BRIEF OF
APPET_jLANT

\

Appeal No. 8601

Defendant and Re.spondent.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
On January 3, 1955, plaintiff and appellant, Weldon
Reeder, entered into a contract (Pl. Ex. B) with the
Valley ~fotor Company of Logan, Utah, for the purchase of a 1955 special order Buick Sedan, turning in
a used car worth $2075.00 as part payment. The Valley
Motor Company, an authorized dealer of the defendant,
then placed an order for this automobile with defendant.
(Pl. Ex. 3) This order was received by the defendant on
January 4, 1955. (Tr. 48 and 49)
Plaintiff's order bearing his name wa.s placed into the
production schedule in the regular course of defendant's
business and production or manufacture of said vehicle
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eompleted on January 14, 1955. (Tr. 49) On January 17;
\"'"alley :\1 otor Company notified Defendant that plaintiff
d~sired

factory delivery and this was arranged pursuant

to a factory delivery authorization form of General
1\lotors Corporation (Pl. Ex. 1) This form indicated that
plaintiff was to pick up the Buick on the morning of
,January 20th, 1955, at the Customer Drive-_._.\ w·ay at
Flint, ~Iichigan, where it was to be delivered b~~ the
factory prior to that date. On January 18, 1955, defendant
delivered the Buick Automobile to the Customer n·rive~\,vay in the name of the plaintiff (Tr. 49 and 50 and Pl.
}~x. 2), at "rhich time a Bill of Sale \Yas executed by
defendant in favor of General ~rotors . .~cceptanee Corporation. (Pl. Ex. C) At the same time, a car invoice
\Ya~ executed sho"ring the car a~ having been sold to
(I eneral Motors A. cceptance Corporation (hereinafter
referred to as Gl\tiAC) for retail delivery to the plaintiff. (Pl. Ex. D) On this san1e forn1, the car invoice, (pl.
r~x. D) "'"aS a Sight Draft payable to G:JL'"~r to be dra\Vll
nn \...- alle~'" -:\1 otor Con1pany, the retail dealer, not due until
.l a nuary 26, 1955. Also, on the bottoin of the Bill of Sale
( 1~1. ~~x. C) frou1 defendant to G~LA.C \Yas a Trust Reeeipt hPt,veen G~fAC and the said \...-alley :hiotor Colnpany, together \Yith a promis~ory note fro1n , . . alley :\Iotor ('io1npany to G~fAC not due until Jauary 26, 10:1;).
Eaeh of thesP documents to-,Yit: The Notice of Shipment
( J~jx.:2), the Billof Sale (Ex. C), and the Car Invoice
( J~jx. D) bore plaintiff's name upon it . and the Notice
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of ShiplllPnt bore the notation aft(•r plaintiff':-~ na1ne:
'"1-:20-_A_ . ~I.". \vhieh corresponded to the scheduled ch·liver~·

date sho\vn on the factory delivery authorization
forrn. (Ex. 1).
On !January 18, 19;)5, plaintiff regi:-~tered the C'ar in
his na1ne and securred license plates. for it. (Tr. 19, 20,
Ex. 4)
The plaintiff n1ade arrange1nents to go hark to Flint,
1Iichigan on January 20, 195;), (Tr. 20) bnt \Va~ delayed because a truck \vhich a friend of his \Vas to driv<·
hack fro1n 1fichigan for \:alley Motor Company would
not be ready until about January 25, 1955, and plaintiff
and his friend -vvere planning to make the trip together.
(Tr. 21)
On January 25, 1955, at about one o 'cock in the
afternoon, plaintiff called the defendant's Custon1er
Drive-Away and asked if they had his ear there for hiln.
(Tr. 22, 36 and 43) Plaintiff was advised that his car
\Vas there and had been there since January 20th. He
was asked why he had not picked it up. ('rr. 36, -+:1).
Plaintiff advised defendant's Custo1ner Drive-A\\ra~r that
he had been dela~red but that he -vvould he there in t\vo
days. Plaintiff was advised by defendant's Customer
Drive-Away that this would be alright, but that they
\Vere charging him storage on the car. (Tr. 36, 43)
Plaintiff agreed to this.
The evening following plaintiff's afternoon conver-
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sation with Defendant's Custon1er Drive-A,vay, 11r. Ray
J)ihnon•, an emplo~ree of the defendant, called plaintiff
ju~t as plaintiff was leaving to catch the airplane to
Flint, and advised plaintiff not to go back to Flint. Apparent!~"" no reason was given. Thi~ was the sa1ne employ<·P of th<-· defendant who told plaintiff on January
2+, 19;):), that plaintiff's car never reached production.
( Tr. 44, 46).
In the afternoon of January 27, 1955, plaintiff ar-

rived at the defendant's Customer Drive-A\Yay at Flint,
)'1 ichigan, and ultimately was shown to the office of :Jfr.
I ... D. Burkhart, whose office was at the Customer Drive~\ "'ay, Flint, Miehigan. Plaintiff inquired about the
car and was advised that "Well your automobile isn't
here.'' ( Tr. 25) Following further conversation, plaintiff \Yas told: "Your car is being reshipped.'' (Tr. 26)
]~lain tiff then inquired: "Had I been here on January
the 20th eould I have gotten n1y automobile~'' ~fr. Burkhart told plaintiff "Yes'' (Tr. 26)
On January 26, 1955, the car distribution department
o I' dPfPndant ·s Buick ~rotor DiYision notified the Drive~\ \\Tay· Departn1ent of Buick l\Iotor Division to return
thP ear for ship1nent and the next day plaintiff's automobilP \Va~ shipped to another dealer. (Tr. 51)
Plaintiff returned hon1e and on June 28, ,1955 comHlPnePd this aetion against Defendant.
Plaintiff allPgP<l

eonver~ion

on the part of the de-
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fendant in refusing to surrender

posse~sion

Inohile to him and in selling it to another,

of

~aid

auto-

contrar~~

to

the right of the plaintiff in the auto1nobile. Plaintiff dt~
manded judgment in the amount of $3507.47 for the con\"er~ion. Defendants answer denied the allegation~ and
a trial \Vas held before First District fJ udge Levvi,..; ,Jones,
and a jury. _At the close of the plaintiff's evidence, thf~
defendant u1oved for a dis1nissal and for a (lirected verdict. The court refused. _A_t thP end of tllP defendant'B
t~Yidenee, botl1 parties n1oved for a Directed \T erdiet, and
on the theory· that there was no controversary in the
facts, and that all questions 'vere questions of law, the
partie.s stipulated that the jury n1ight he dis1nissed and
the matter handled by the judge in the forrn of a directed
verdict. On October 8, 1956, the District Court entered
the judgment appealed from granting defendant's ~'lo
tion for a Directed Verdict.
The District Court, in announcing its decision in
open court, based its ruling in favor of the defendant
upon one of two grounds: (1) That the defendant had the
right to rescind the sale, or exercise the right of stoppage in transitu, and (2) That under the trust receipt the
security 'vas held in the car by General Motors Acceptance Corporation until the cash was received. (Tr.

65, 66)

STATEMEN1, OF POINTS
That the District Court erred in granting de-
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fendant 's motion for a directed verdict and in failing to
g-rant plaintiff's motion for a directed verdict rnade at
the conclusion of the evidence of the case.

This being an appeal from a judgment entered on
a directed verdict for the defendant, the evidence in
the case must be viewed in light most favorable to plaintiff and all evidence favorable to the plaintiff must be
accepted as true and as providing all farts which it
reasonably tends to prove, and the plaintiff is entitled
to the benefit of all inferences fairly deducible therefron1. 2 Barron & Holtzoff, Federal Practice & Procedure, Section 1075, Page 761, and cases cited therein .
..:\.t the trial, the defendant offered no testimony

fron1 \Yitne~set-', and the testirnony offered by the plaintj ff i~ uncontradicted. There appears to be no conflict of
fact and the deter1nination of the respective right~ and
<lntie~ of the parties lie~ in an application of .3tatutory
rule~ of la\v to those facts. The particular statute~ involved are the Trust Receipts .A.ct and the Sales ~\ct.
J~oth lTtah and Michigan have adopted the l . . niform Law
on each of these subjects, so reference in this brief will
be 1nade to the lT tah I~a"" only.
T,he plaintiff contends that he is a ·~Buyer in the
< )rdinary c:onrse of Trade'' a~ defined in the Trust Rf·ePipt~ ~\et, ~Pe. 9-2-1, TT. l~ ...A. 1953, and is protected as
~nell. r(1hp Plaintiff lllaintains that he \Vas the purchaser
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of the auto1nobile in question and that he had the right
of irn1nediate possession at the time the def(?ndant sold
the autornobile for a

~econd

time to a third party.

The undisputed facts are that plaintiff entered into
a contract to huy· a rar frorn defendant's authorized dealer. The dealer ordered the car fron1 defendant, in the
narne of the plaintiff, and the defendant produced the
car and delivered it to its Custon1er Drive-i\ \Vay in the
narne of the plaintiff. .A_t the ~arne ti111P, defendant executed a Bill of Sale in favor of General 11:otors ~L\.ceept
ance Corporation, 'vho in turn gave a Trust Receipt in
favor of the dealer with whon1 plaintiff had his contract. In all of the documents refering to the car, plaint'"'
iff '\vas identified as the retail purchaser of it. lTnder
this arrangen1ent, General 1\fotors Acceptance Corporation \vas the en trustor, and \,.alley Motor Co1npany, the
defendant's dealer with whom plaintiff contracted, was
the trustee. And, at this point in the procedure, the defendant had divested its self of title by virtue of the Bill
of Sale to G-eneral 1fotor~ Acceptance Corporation.
1. Was the plaintiff, on the facts, a Buyer in the Ordinary Course of Trade and protected as sllch ·under Sec.
9-2-1,

u. c. .A., 1953?
The above stated Section reads as follo,vs:
''Buyer in the ordinary course of trade' rneans a
person to whom goods are sold and delivPred for
new value and who acts in good faith and without actual knowledge of a limitation on the
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trustee's liberty of sale, including one who takes
by conditional sale or under a pre-existing mercantile contract with the trustee to buy the goods
delivered, or like goods, for cash or on credit ... ''
The plaintiff meticulously fits into

thi.~

definition.

He \vas sold the goods by \r alley ~f otor Company· under
a Retail Car Contract and paid $2075.00 for then1 in the
forn1 of a trade-in. This comes within the phrase ''a preexisting mercantile contract \vith the trustee (\Talley
2\f otor Con1pany) to buy the goods delivered for cash
or on credit.'' There was no limitation on the trustee's
liberty of sale, (See bottom of Ex. C for Trust Receipt)
but even if there were the plaintiff's good faith has not
been question and actual knowledge of any limitation has
nPver been asserted.
~\s

to the delivery factor, no case la"~ has succintly
placed the boundaries of the tern1 deliYery as here used.
Its purpose, however, has been con11nented on as being
a requisite to prevent collusive transactions ""'"here there
i~ no actual sale. See Heindl, Trust Receipt Financing
under the Uniform Trust Receipts Act., 26 Chi.-Kent L.
Rev. 197, 246 (1948). No such factor appears any,Yhere
in this en~e, therefore the question of "deliYery" is not
n ~uhstantial problen1. But be that as it may, there \Yas
a dPlivPry in this ease \vhich should n1ore than satisfy the
reqni retnPnt~ of the statute. ~\ t the tilne \ 7 alley ~Iotor
l~ou1pan)c placed the plaintiff~ car order (Ex. 3) \vith the
dPI'Pndant, a ~peeial shunp containing '"Flint Retail
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Store, na1ne, date, time," was placed on this order over
the plaintiffs nan1e and over the date and ti1ne "1-20
r\~I ". When the plaintiff called aa a witness Mr. Robert
Dilmore, who \Vas, during the tillH:' 0 r the tran~aetion
1nentioned herein, a district 1nanager for Buick ~Iotor DiYi~ion of the defendant General ~Jotors Corporation
( Tr. 31), ~fr. Dihner 'vas asked the follo-\ving question:
Question by ~1r. Olson:
'· 'Vell, how does the Buick Division know that the
ear should be kept at the customer drive-away rather
than sent to the dealer)?''

. A. nswer by

~T r.

Dihnore :

"Well, that is established on that Wholesale Car
Order Form by a special stamp." (Tr. 52)
l\Ir. Diln1ore vvas then shown the wholesale car order

and he identified the special stamp on it. ( Tr. 53)
The question was then asked Mr. Dilmore:
''So that when the dealer indicates that on the
\vholesale order the custo1ner wants factory delivery and
that stamp is placed on there, Buick Motor Division acknowledges that information and agrees to deliver it to
the Custonter Drive-Away~''
n{r. Dilmore's answer was:" That is right." (Tr. 53)
Then, on January 18th, 1955, the defendant executed
Exhibit 2, the Notie of Shipment giving notice that the
automobile which had been manufactured or produced
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pursuant to the order for plaintiff was shipped to defPndant 's drive-away, Flint, Michigan. This Notice of
Hhip1uent identifies a sales order. by Number 8091, the
sa1ne nu1nber contained on the wholesale car order,
J~~xhibit3.

And there 1s no question but that the auto1nobile
\vas· delivered to Customer Drive-A\\-ay by defendant.·
rrhe question was asked the defendant, (Tr. 49): "Was
the said vehicle ever delivered to Buick Customer Drive-

Answer: ''Yes.''
Question : ''If so,

when~''

Answer : ''January 18, 1955. ''
Question: ''If so, in the name of what custo1ner J?"
. . \nswer : ' 'Weldon R. Reeder.''
Certainly this constitute8 a sufficient delivery.
"f;l.,.hitn1ore Oxygen Co. vs. Utah State Tax Conun., 114
ll. 1, 196 P(2d) 976, (1948) at Page 980: Haynes vs. Douglu.-..· f<'ir J!J.r. C'~o., Ore., 90 P(2d) 761, (1939) .
.:\nd see in this respect the Utah case of ]fiddleton vs.
I~rnns,

86 1J. 396, 45 P. (2d) :170, (1935), \\'"herein this

Court said :

'·If there is an)· qupstion about the delivery in
this case to the carrier being sufficient to constitutP an· unconditional appropriation to this contraet, it "·ill hP 8Pttled h)· the fact that it i~ a \VPll-:
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established rule that delivery to a person appointed by the buyer to receive the goods or to any third
person at the buyer's request or with his consent
is sufficient delivery to the buyer." Citing authority.
But to take the n1atter a step further, and assurning for purpo~~ of argun1ent that the facts ahove stated
do not constitute a delivery under the Trust Receipts Act,
it i~ snlnnitted that there are a long linP of cases holding
that actualruanual transfer of pos~ession is not necessar~·
to constitute delivery. In r·an Drinunelen Y~. Conrerse,
190 lo\va 1350, 181 N. W. 699 (1921) it was stated that
d Deliver~: does not irnply a physical change of location,
hut is deterrnined h!r the intent of the parties at the
tln1e of the sale to transfer to the vendee the dominion
and control over the thing purchased". No part of the
purchase priee in that case had been paid, nor had the
hi1yer removed the goods fron1 the seller's prernises,
·but is vvas the understanding of the parties that the buyer
\vas to · · rernove the corn from the premises as soon as
possible,'. The court held that this constituted sufficient
deliYer~~ in construing the important delivery requireInent of the statute of frauds.
· Similarly in the lavv of Bailments, wl1ere the lavv
requiref-i a delivery of the property from the bailor to
the bailee as an essential element of the baihnent contract,
the lavv always recognizes a baihnent in situations where
a vendor of goods retains possession of them under circumstances where the property in the goods has passed,
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and hold thP vendor of the property to be the bailee
even though there has been no physical delivery of the
property to the bailee. 8 C. J. S. Bailments, 3 (g).
In thP

ca~e

at bar, the automobile was shipped hy

the deff·ndant to the Custo1ner Drive-A,vay in the na1ne
of the plaintiff. It was to be picked up by the plaintiff on
.f anuary 20, 19:1;). This \vas in lieu of the more usual

ship1nent to the dealer and later delivery to the buyt>r.
It \vas agreed by all concerned that the Custo1ner Driy·e_A_ \vay garage \vas to be the delivery point. This "~as cbnfirnted hy a telephone conversation on January 25, 19;):-l,
'vhen the personnel of the garage informed the plaintiff
that they 'vere holding the automobile for hun charging
him storage, and then inquired when he would be there
to pick the car up. This, along with the 1nany documents
that named the plaintiff and the place of delivery. would
see1n to be sound proof of the intetion of the parties.
Further, these facts are indicative of the accepted
relationship between the parties. The garage was charging storage, fron1 the date of defendant's delivery to it
on the 20th. T hey \Yere bai1ees of the auto1nobile for the
benefit of the plaintiff. the bailor. This is supported by
the 1nany railroad carrier cases. \Vhich if not directly
in point. are ver~T closely analagous to the present situation. In Nehneyer LuJuber Co. vs Burlington cf· llf. R. R.
Co., ;)+ Neb. 321, 74 N. ,~v. 670 (1898), the court stated
that ''When delivery is made to a carrier . he is in conten11
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plation of law the bailee of the person to vvhou1 and not
h~~ 'vhom goods are consigned.'' 1 hus it has long been
the rule of lavv that the vendee and not the vendor has thP
ri~k of loss once deliver~T to the carrier has been xnade and
has the right to sue the carrier for negligenee.
1

Carrier's also charge storage on goods ready to be
pieked up after the passage of frpe ti1ne, as do other
hailee 's such as warehousemen at the end of the railroad
line, and as we submit does the Customer Drive-Away
Garage who is in receipt of an automobile shipped to
them from the factory to be held for a buyer .
.A_~ccording

to the Notice of Shipment, (Exhibit 2)

the auton1obile was shipped to the Customer Drive-Away
G-arage on January 18, 1955 as per the agree1nent of the
parties. Although the carrier is unknown, the evidence
indicated that the auto1nobile vvas shipped and that it
did arrivP at the garage. Sec. 60-3-6, 1T. C. _,.;\., 1953 indieate~ that under this set of facts it is "deemed to be deliver~~ of the goods to the huyel' ... '' ~:lldrrJJI(U1 Bros. Co.
v~.Westinghouse Air Brake Co. 92 Conn. 419, 103 A. 267
(1918). The exception stated in Sec. 60-2-3, Rule (5),
does not change this result.
It should be firmly kept in xnind that at all tixne~
during the critical periods involved in this action th~~
property in the automobile had passed from the defendant.
Rule ;) of Section 60-2-3, l '. C. A.,

19:13~

provides :
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"If a contract to sell requires the seller to deliver the goods to the buyer, or at a partinlar place,
or to pay the freight or cost of transportation to
the huyer or to a particular place, the property
. does not pass until the goods have heen delivered
to the buyer or have reached the place agre~d
upon.'' (Emphasis ours)
See also Rule 2 concerning contracts to sell speeifir
goods and Rule 4(a) coneerning contracts to sell unascertained or future goods by description when goods of that
deseription and in a deliverable Btate are unconditionally appropriated to the contract.

In Birdsong et al vs. W. H.

d!; F. ,Jordon, Jr. Inc., 297

Fed. 742, ( 1924) the court construed the N e'v York la"T
in this respect by saying that 'vhen a chattel is to be delivered to a particular place and it is so delivered, title
then passes. Possession of the goods has no bearing on
the question of when title passes. The court also pointed
out that title Ina~~ pass si1nultaneously to a buyer and
to a purcha~er fro1n that buyer 'Yhen delivery i~ to be
utade at the same time and place.
The plaintiff submits that on the facts he

"~as

buyer

1n the ordinary course of trade and the provisions of
Sec. 9-2-9, (2) lT.C.A., 1953, apply.

'r

turn no"~ to the que~tion of the right~ of the
defendant in disposing of the ~\utomobile and the right.5
of plaintiff under ~aid Sec. 9-2-9, (2) lT.C.A., 1953.
P

I I. Did the defendant hal;e the rights of an entruster
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,wnder the tr-tttst receipt issued on Jantutr,t;
The Trust Receipt \Vas

i~~ lt\~1 h~;

18, l(J:).}.)

tl1 \

·l· ,·(·n lr!lt

naming General Motor's Acceptance Corporation, herein
referred to as GMAC, as the entrustor and Valley Motor
Con1pany as the trustee. This gave GMAC a security
interest in the automobile and gave \Talley Motor Company the po\\~(Jl' to sell it, \Vh~eh, ot· conr."i(~. 1: )(\:.~ ·"l~l d<Y:1~·.
1

rrhe purpose of this transaction is evident. GMAC -beeornP~

the financing agency, paying the defendant for
the autornobile and receiving by assignn1ent the rights
of the seller. <+eneral Motors thereby avoids the financing ri~k and tlte administrative expense. The remaining interest of the defendant is of a parental nature in
looking out for a close business associate. Since General l\Iotors and GMAC are two separate corporations,
to hold that General Motors can exercise rights assigned to GMAC is to say that there is no distinction bet\veen the two.
~\~su1ning,

however, that the defendant can exercise those rights the ques.tion becomes: ''Can those rights
prevail over a Buyer in the ordinary Course of Trade~
See. 9-2-9 (2) rr.c.A., 1953, is emphatic when it says
'' ... such buyer takes free of the entruster's security
interest in the goods so sold . . . ''
This result and it's justification can be found in
Peoples Finance and Thrift Co. of f",isalia

li.

Bow·man et

al, 58 Cal Ap 2d 729, 1:17 P2d. ( 194:1), a ea~P \\'hjeh
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points out that it

\Ya~

the InisplaePd confidence of the en..

trustor in the trustee's integrity that caused the loss.
rl_lhe entrustor lllUSt stay (·onstistent with the faith hP has
placed in his trustee. See also Conunercial Discount Co.
n. ilfehne, 42 Cal i\p 2d 220, 108 P2d 73;), (1941).

III. lJid the Defendant on the facts have right to e.rer("7Se an nnJHtid seller's lien 'Under Sec. 60-4-1,

r1 .C.~-1.,

In its oral decision, the lo,ver court indicated that
defendant had the rights of an unpaid seller. to -"~it:
right to rescind and stoppage in transitu. To exerri:'e
such rights, the seller must comply 'vith the requisites
as set out in the sales act. which is in effect both in lTtah
and Michigan.
a) Was the Defendant an unpaid Seller?
The Bill of Sale and Invoice sho'v on their face
that "rhen the title passed from General ~Iotors to
GMAC, GMAC gave ''valuable consideration~·. The defendant has stated that this eonsi8ted of a note that 'Ya~
]a tP r retu r11 ed under the date of Janna ry 31. 19:1~. This
\Vas after the ronYersation in question and ha:' no bearing on the postion of the seller at the thne of the convPrsion. FurthPr it n1ust he pointed out that the letter
snpposedl~r ~Pnt on .T anuar~~ 31. 1955 "~as stan1ped rePived h~r thP addressee in .August of 1955, after suit had
heen filed. That fact remains that at the thne of the

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

17

<'onversation on January 26, 19;)5, the seller had in his
hand~

valuable consideration for the sale and transfer

of the autoinobile. A negotiable note in thP hands of the
~P ller 1nean~

that he ha~ been .. conditionally paid",
that is, that he has surrendered the right to ~ue on the
obligation until the instrument is due.
But even assuming that the defendant had not been
paid and that the goods had been sold on credit, the
Sales Act onl~r allows exercise of the lien, upon which the
right to rescind depends, when the terrn of crPdit has expired. (Sec. 60-4-3, lT. C. A., 1953) The tern1 of credit
on all doctnnents bet"~een G:\J AC and their trustee, \ralley· ~Iotor Con1pany, as well as on the note between
(}"jL-\C and the defendant was January 26, 1955 and
the auto1nobile was resold during that business day,
prior to the statutory time for payrnent. Sec. 44-1-87,
r~.c.A., 1953.
This also goes to substantiate the fact
that the defendant was not an unpaid seller.
1\~. Right of defendant to e.rtrcise stopJHlffP i'JI tran.-.,·it1f.

Stoppage in transitu, being an Pxtention of the
rit!·ht of the seller's lien is subject to all the infirtnitie;-;
already mentioned, to-wit: defendant is not an unpaid
seller, or assun1ing the sale was made on credit, the ter1n
of credit had not expired. Further under the clear wording of the statute the goods were no longer in transit
after the arrival of the goods at the appointed destination (The Customer Drive-Away), and after the carrier
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ol' other hailt>e ackno\vledges to the buyer that he holds
the goods on his hehalf and continues in posse~sion of
them as bailee for the b.uyer. Sec. 60-4-7 (2) (b), li.C.A.,
1953. The phone call already referred to con1e.s directl~,~
\Vi thin this provision of the code.
Even if this were not so, the defendant would still
not have the right of stoppage in transitu in light of
the counuon law doctrine laid down in J/ enzphis cf· L.R.R.
Co. vs. Freed, 38 Ark. 614 (1882) and as more fully enunciated in Neimeyer Lumber Co. v. Burlington & Jf.R.R.
Co. :}4 Neb. 321, 74 N. W. 670 at page ()7(). \Yhere it \Ya~
held that "In order that a vendor of goods 1uay exercise the right of stoppage in transitu, it i.s e~sential that
the goods at the time be in transit from such vendor to
his immediate vendee". This decision is based on the
theory that consignment to a sub vendee makes inequitable a refusal of delivery based on the failure of the vendee, to "~horn the vendor has extended trust and credit.
Tnherent in thi~ vie"~ is the fact that the Yendor has
acquiesced in the sale to the ~ub-Yendee and i~ fully a'"arP of hi~ purchase and right~ in the good~. There
<·an he litth~ que~tion that in the case at bar. the defendant had full kno,vledge of the re~nle and the ~ub-YeiHiee ·~
right.-:; and interest in the auton1obile for the consignlll<>nt \\ra~ to a rle~tination eon1pletely out of reach of his
iHnnediate huyer. \"'"alle~~ ~[otor Co1npany, and for the
pu rpo~P of, a~ the e.onsignment indicates. deliYery to
the plaintiff.
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\~.

Notwithstanding all of the above, if it is found
that the defendant had either the right to exercise an unpaid seller's lien or the right of stoppage in transitu, the subsequent resale of the automobile was directly contrary in its timing and method to the remedy laid down in the Sales Act,
Sec. 60-4-9, U.C.A., 193.

The right of resale given in the Sales . A_rt. 60-4-2,
r~.c.A., 1953, is limited by Sec. 60-4-9.
The resale of the goods rna~~ be 1nade if 1) ''the
goods are of perishable nature''. Certainl~r not relevant
here. 2) Where the seller expressl~~ reserves the right
of resale in case of buyers default. Again not applicable, because there was no evidence whatsoever of su(lh
a reservation. 3) "Where the buyer has been in default
in the pay1nent of the price an unreasonable time". As
ha~ heen pointed out, the buyer was not even in default
at all. In the first place, defendant, in the Bill of Sale
executed hy it, acknowledged payment, and in the second place, assuming credit was involved, the resale here
\vas 1nade on the same day that the credit extended -vvas
to n1aturt-. ''In the absence of proof of presentment for
payn1ent, the defendant cannot claiin that the plaintiff
\vas in default in the payment of the purchase price".
O'Kane v. North American Distilling Co., 171 NYS 27~,
(1918). They went on to say: "Even if, however, -vve
assu1ne that the plaintiff was in default the defendant
c·nuld not sell the goods without proper notice to the
plaintiff and there is no evidence in the case that such
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notice was given."

The case at bar, like the 0 'Ka,ne

case is an exantple of a

.~ale

by a seller alleging

1ner~l~r

a right to possession as security for the purchase price,
ntade \vithout any justification.
Subsection ( 3) of 60-4-9 points out that in such a
ease as this notice i~ relevant in any issue involving the
question \vhether the buyer had been in default an unreasonable time before the resale \vas 1nade. It is submitted that even without this provision the ti1ne of the
resale \vas patently unreasonable, the same being n1ade
on the day the demand note \vas dated.
The question of recission is subject to precisely the
sarne infirn1ities as the resale provision. Sec. 60-5-3.
'"rhat is, default n1ust be for an unreasonable tune, or the
right 1nust be reserved. It is doubtful that the defendant elaims a rescission. having based its argument on
the trial level on the assumption that the plaintiff had
no rights. Any argument before this court would have
to be based on the letter of January 31, 1955 which \vas
transmitted after the resale and thus ineffectiYe prior to
the conversion claimed.
Finally Utah Code .A. nnota ted Sec. 60-4-11 ( 1~1:1:3)
\vould see1n to stress the importance of the above facts.
It states · · ... the unpaid seller's right of lien or stoppap;P i11 transitu is not affected by any sale, or other
disposition of thP goods \Yhich the buyer may have 1nade,
'll nle."·s the seller has as~ented thereto." (emphasis ours).
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The legislature by these words confirm the view that
assent hy the seller to a further sale hy hif-; buyer not
only affects the right~ of the ;seller hut defeats the1n in
favor of the sub-vendee. This, then, is the underlying
ha~j~ of the case decisions herein cited, of the Uniform
Trust Receipts Act, and of the l~nifor1n Sales Act, all of
'vhich are the foundations of the lTtah Code.
reeurrent theme that cannot be ignored.

It is a

CONCLlTSION
The testimony and the docun1entary evidence in this
ea~e seen1s to clearl:~ establish that the sequence of
events, the sequence of interest and rights in the propert:~ and the sequence of right to possession in thi~
ca~e, following plaintiff's order fron1 defendant's dealer and the dealer's order from the defendant in plaintiff\~ name, were, and without doubt the parties involved intended it to be this 'vay if the doclnnent;s executed
h~y them are to mean anything at all, as follo,vs:
Fron1 the manufacturer (the defendant General
i\l otors) to the entrustor ( G1VLA C). froin the en trustor
((r~r ~\C) to the dealer,i' trustee (\7 alley l\{otor Compan:~) and from the dealer to the retail purehaser (Plaintjff). Jones vs. Comercial Investr;nent Trust, 64 U. 151,
228 Pac. 869 (1924), particularly at 902. By unanimous
agreement, the plaintiff's right to im1nediate posse;ssion
waf.: fixed as of the morning of January 20, 1955. Everything agreed and contemplated to be performed had been
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performed at that tin1e, and plaintiff's rights beca1ne
vested. It is difficult to see how a self-serving, ex parte
act h~r the defendant eould destroy these vested rights
of plaintiff.
And finally, since a number of referencP3 has been
ntade to the Sales . ."--ct, the Court's attention is directed
to Section 60-5-4, 1~tah Code Annotated, 1953, 'vhich
provides:

G0-5--±. Action hy Buyer For Converting or Detaining Goods. - Where the property in the goods
has passed to the buyer and. the seller 'vrongfully
neglects or refuses to deliver the goods, the buyer
may maintain any action allowed by law to the
owner of goods of similar kind 'vhen wrongfully
converted or withheld.
Respectfully submitted.
BULLEN & OLSOK
By Charles P. Olson
Attorneys for Plaintiff
and Appellant.
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